BRIEF HINTS ON THE GREEK ARTICLE
[p. 91] BRIEF HINTS ON THE GREEK ARTICLE
All my experience has confirmed the principle stated elsewhere, that the article is used when the object of the mind is spoken of, and is left out when the word or combination of words is characteristic. This does not at all conflict with its being the notion expressed by the substantive as viewed by the speaker as an individual,+ which, as another form of the thought, is correct enough, but gives no expression to the import of the absence of the article. All the particular cases and rules are but reducing expressions under the general principle, often multiplied (as in Middleton) by ignorance of it. I doubt altogether that his notion of the general rule not applying where there is a preposition, or with proper names, etc., has the least truth in it.
Thus, as to abstract nouns++ here, the rule only perplexes. I confess I do not understand particularizing an abstract idea: perhaps individualizing or personifying is meant. JO novmo” may be abstract or not. If I have spoken of a particular novmo”, oJ novmo” realizes that novmo” as an individual; or, as I should say, presents it as a definite object to the mind. If I have no such law mentioned, oJ novmo” would be “the thing law,” law viewed as an object before my mind as such. Abstract nouns are a kind of personification. “Law” does this, “law” does that. If I say dia; novmou it is something that happens on that principle; it is only characteristic.
Anarthrous nominatives+++ (such as kalo;” ga;r qhsauro;” par j ajndri; spoudaivw/ cavri” ojfeilomevnh, Isocr. page 8 B: lovgo” ajlhqh;” ... kai; divkaio” yuchsee footnote” ajgaqhsee footnote” kai; pisthsee footnote” ei[dwlovn ejstin, Id. page 28 A) express moral characteristics, beings or things that have a certain quality. It is what each is, anything that has this character. It is not an abstraction but a universal, that is, a species which is known by a predicate of each individual that has such a character. There may be many a cavri”, and all sorts of lovgoi not such as these. So pavntwn crhmavtwn mevtron a[nqrwpo” (Plat. Theaet. 8) is the character of the measure used. JO a[nqrwpo”would point out an object, the race viewed as one whole, where some specified individual was not meant (that is, if you please, one individual, real or ideal); it is always a subsisting thing to the mind, about which something is affirmed. Hence, as an abstract noun is an objective personification of the idea, it has the article. But a universal, or species, as in these anarthrous instances, is the character of all the individuals composing it. If a characteristic universal be not seized, it is impossible to understand the omission of the article in Greek.
+“The article ... was used merely to represent the notion expressed by the substantive, as viewed by the speaker as an individual, one of a class, and distinct from all the other members of that class.” Jelf’s Gr. Gr., � 446
++“Abstract nouns, when considered as such, do not take the article, as an abstract noun is not capable of individuality; but the article is used sometimes either to define or particularize the abstract.” Jelf’s Gr. Gr., � 448.
+++“The subject generally has the article, while the predicate generally is without it ... . When the subject however is spoken of generally, and indefinitely, it has not the article: Plat. Theaet. 8, pavntwn crhmavtwn mevtron a[nqrwpo” ... The subject can also stand without the article as a general notion, while the predicate, as expressing something definite, has it; here the article is demonstrative: Philemon ap. Stob. Floril. Grot. page 211, eijrhvnh ejsti; tajgaqovn.” Jelf’s Gr. Gr., � 460. [”Anarthrous,” in grammar, means without the article.]
[p. 92] An abstract noun as such has always the article, because it is always the personification of the idea, its reduction to an objective individual. But in so intellectual (or if you please imaginative) a language as Greek, it requires keen perception to see why or why not an article is used. Just so in English: “The daylight came.” I am thinking of daylight as a positive substantive thing. “It was already daylight.” Here daylight characterizes the state of atmosphere, of surrounding nature, spoken of as day. “It” is the mind’s object, “daylight” the state or character of it. I could perfectly well say “Daylight came,” and I should think of the state of the scene around me, though the thing characterized is not expressed. We have a strong case in novmo” pareishsee footnotelqen. JO novmo” would have been the Jewish law: here it would not do either, to say oJ novmo” for the abstract idea. It was merely the legal principle which characterized the dealings of God, the state of things; but, as “daylight,” it means the state in which the world is. This explains eijrhvnh ejsti; tajgaqovn. It is peace, a state of peace. You might have said hJ eijrhvnh, and then it would have been the thing itself. But tajgaqovn is not a predicate characterizing eijrhvnh — does not affirm that peace is good, but that peace is the good thing, the one good thing. It is the abstract idea individualized. It would have been ajgaqhv if it had been a predicate.
In Matthew 1: 1, (Bivblo” genevsew” jIhsousee footnote Cristousee footnote,) it is the common case of a title, and exceptional; as in English one might say, “Book of Wisdom”; yet were I making a sentence, I should say, “The Book of Wisdom is so and so.” It is elliptical. The name of what follows (not anything as to each) is to;n jIsaavk. The article is usually put with known persons, because they are definite objects before the mind. Were one never heard of before, it would be anarthrous; but with the article it would be “that Isaac which you know so well of in Genesis, the well-known Isaac.”
[p. 93] The same remark applies to Matthew 7: 25, 27. It is the well-known rain and floods; the rain came on. I should say in English, “The rain was very heavy on a particular day — the rain spoiled flowers.” It is a well-known particular object in nature before the eyes. But it would be better to say, “The rain spoils the flowers,” because both become objective. The rain did it. I could say, “Rain spoils flowers.” This is aphoristic; which is always anarthrous, because essentially characteristic. If I say, “The rain spoiled,” it is again objective — the rain on a given day in my mind. If I say, “It was not heat, it was rain spoiled them,” rain becomes characteristic, in contrast with heat, of a state of the weather. It is something of a proper name, but a proper name has not an article when the person is not known or has not been mentioned.
I do not believe that there is any difference as to Kuvrio” or Qeov”, save that they may be proper names. Compare, for Kuvrio”, Matthew 1: 20, 22, 24; 2: 15, 19; 3: 3; 4: 7, 10; 21: 9; 23: 39; Mark 11: 9; 13: 20; Luke 1: 16, 17, 32, 38, 45, 58, 66, 68, 76; 2: 9, 23, 24, 26, 39; 3: 4; 4: 8; 5: 17; 19: 38; John 1: 23; Acts 2: 20, 39; 3: 22; 5: 9, 19; 7: 31, 37; 8: 26, 39; 12: 7, 23; 13: 10, 11. JO Kuvrio” is often not a name but an office, as oJ cristov”, unless they may have been mentioned before so as to make them a present object here. In Matthew 1: 20, Kurivou is the character of the angel, a[ggelo” is the simple way of saying one when there are many; oJ a[ggelo” would not do if there were many, unless followed by a characteristic word, the angel of the Lord; then I think of one to the exclusion, at least then, of all others.
As to Matthew 13: 6 (hJlivou ajnateivlanto”) I do not accept the hJlivou being a proper name. It is at sunrise — a characteristic state. I might say “the rising of the sun,” as in Mark 16: 2; then I have an object. So with ghsee footnote, qavlassa, kovsmo”, oujranov”, hJmevra, ajnhvr, gunhv, pathvr, etc.
Again, to; o[ro” in Matthew 5: 1; 14: 23; Mark 3: 13 (cf. Luke 6: 12, 17), does not mean some particular mountain well known by this name (as Wetstein and Rosenmuller think); nor “a mountain” (as in the Authorized Version, Campbell, Newcome, Schleusner); but “the mountain” in the sense of the hill-country or highlands, in contrast with “the plain.” The same principle accounts for th;n pevtran in Matthew 7: 24, 25; only that this is made more obvious by the expressed contrast in verse 26, of th;n a[mmon. Just so with th;n oijkivan, Matthew 9: 10; 10: 12, 13, in contrast with “without” or “the open air,” and twsee footnote/ ajgrwsee footnote/ contrasted with “the city” or “town”; similarly eij” to; ploisee footnoteon “on board ship” (Matthew 13: 2, etc.) in contrast with being “ashore,” unless in cases where reference required the article, as perhaps in chapter 4: 21; 9: 1. In Mark 1: 45, eij” povlin is purposely characteristic (and not a licence because of the preposition, as is commonly said) “into town,” any town: so eij” ajgrovn, in chapter 16: 12, and eij” oi\kon in chapter 2: 1, meaning “at home.” The article might or might not be used in many cases; but the phrase or thought is never precisely the same.
[p. 94] With a proper name as such, one can hardly have an article, save as a reference, and this not immediate, I apprehend. If I say oJ Xenofwsee footnoten, it is the well-known man, or the Xenophon I have been speaking about — always as a designated object of thought: why so, it may be a question which only appears afterwards, and hence is anticipative. When the person is named historically, the article disappears; when spoken of as a direct object before the writer’s mind, and meant to be so pointed out to the reader, the article is used (as in ordinary appellatives). When not thus referred to or presented, one cannot point out a name as a subject-matter of thought: it is a predicate then and anarthrous as usual.
So pasee footnotesa JIerosovluma is not an exceptional case. JIer. is a name, and as such without an article; and the name is necessarily an individual. You cannot gather a name of a city into one as a country or province, like pasee footnotesa hJ jIoudaiva. By the article a country is brought before the mind as one whole. But if one thinks of a name simply, the article is excluded, a name being not a thing but something said about a thing. The sense in this case is pasee footnotesa [hJ povli”, which city is called] JIerosovluma. A river has the article; because from its nature, like a district, it needs this sign of unity as a whole.
Romans 4: 13 is a simple case of the general rule, to which I admit no exception for prepositions; dia; novmou was the character or way of his getting the promise. So dia; dikaiosuvnh” pivstew” “by righteousness of faith.” It was not by law. The case is a very simple one. So in Romans 1: 17, ejk pivstew” characterizes the revelation, eij” pivstin the manner of its reception. God’s righteousness is revealed (not merely dia; but) ejk pivstew”, excluding claims of birth, ordinances, works, etc., by faith as the sole ground, eij” pivstin, and therefore open to faith wherever found.
[p. 95] The abstract noun is more abstract, if that could be said, with an article than without. It is in the essence of its nature, all things foreign to it apart; hJ aJmartiva is “that thing called sin,” as such in itself. A being is only what it is, or it is not that being, but another. Hence when it is said hJ aJmartiva ejsti;n hJ ajnomiva, they are identical: one of the things before my mind is itself and no more; but the other is the same with it, as itself and no more. This is the effect of an article with an abstract noun.
There are nouns, it may be remarked here, which are generalizations more than abstractions. Thus novmo”: in general, it is a certain particular rule, and becomes a general idea of acting on the principle of a rule. In such cases it is hard to use the article without returning to the particular form which one has generalized. Law gives the idea of an actual concrete thing. Hence I have a mental difficulty to decide in Romans 4: 15, whether it is abstract. It would be more naturally abstract law, “the thing law”; but with this word, which is first known as an actual existing objective code, it is difficult, when thus taken by itself, not to return to the particular. When hJ aJmartiva is used, I should have no difficulty.
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Objective is before the mind as an object, objective truths for instance. Subjective is the quality of mind by which opinions are formed. Thus I judge respecting God when I judge what He ought to be by what is in my own mind: objectively He is presented in revelation. Now what is objective has the article. It points out the object. (Logically it becomes the subject in a proposition, but this is another matter wholly.) The use of the article and all speech must depend on the view the mind takes of a thing; only where the speech is formed we have to judge what view has been taken.
[p. 96] Now the theory propounded is that the object of the mind has the article, the attributives or qualities have not, and that mentally. And here Middleton’s theory (which indeed is merely the subject and predicate as to the metaphysical side of it) comes in. JO is the object before the mind, that is, refers to it, explained by the word following in its nature or distinctive character. This forms the subject of a proposition; the predicate without the article (unless reciprocal) is affirmed about it. It is very simple, and has nothing to do with the view one’s mind takes of the passage. It is a rule positive, that objects have, attributes or characteristics of objects have not, the article. When I find one, there is an object referred to; when none, it is qualification.
As after ei\ce, I have noticed in my paper (as Middleton also recognizes) verbs “to have” as taking an anarthrous noun. JH gunhv would be some particular woman, or woman kind: that thing, the individual before our eyes or mind; or that thing, woman.
In Greek plays the choruses are noted for leaving out the article, and (unless emphatic) the tragedians before names.
That predicates have the article as apposition seems to me want of critical discernment. The bousee footnoten is some well-known ox, and then tovn is necessary.+
Reasoning from English to Greek, save as arriving at abstract principles, is beside the mark. All verbs of existence (as Middleton recognizes) are (save on some exceptional account) without the article; because I must have, if I say “was,” something existing before my mind. To the question “what” (qualification) is answered a[nqrwpo”. Now here ejgevneto or ejstiv takes the same place as oJ. I point out objectively, that is, affirm existence. I say what? [Anqrwpo”. So ei\ce — what? o[rnin. Th;n o[rnin is Greek equally, but it is a particular bird, already the object of the mind, that bird; not “what,” but individual.
The first line of the Iliad, as Middleton remarks from Apollonius D., is not pure Greek. Mhsee footnotenin a[eide, etc. In pure Attic it would be th;n mhsee footnotenin; but such things do not set aside the rule.
Again, with to;n jAlevxandron kai; Fivlippon, which I cannot now trace,++ I should expect to find a mental reference in the writer to the king of Macedonia, or some such object, both names being distinctive or characteristic examples. I do not believe mentally tovn applies to either but may be mere freedom of style — using the article to the first and not for the second as in the same category; so in Acts 15: 22. It is only where two agents come under one mental thought that this is the case. And I think in reference to it, Paul and Barnabas, or Alexander and Philip, become a single object to the mind. The idiom unites in the one article either two qualities of the same person or two persons under the same quality.
In the case of a proposition it is evident that the predicate is characteristic of the subject, its genus or category. Man is an animal. Where it is simply “there was,” h\n or ejgevneto, what is this proposition? The noun answers to “what,” just as the predicate does. When I say “was,” “something was,” what was? A man. In the ordinary proposition I have oJ a[nqrwpo” as a subject before me; when I say ejstivn, I wait to know what. If I say h\n or ejgevneto, I say What h\n or ejgevneto? I answer a[nqrwpo”: it characterizes; it is the nature or category of the thing which exists, or an affirmation about it. Existence is the thing affirmed, or a something existing. “What” comes in the noun, and is anarthrous. If not, then a[nqrwpo” would be the subject, or the proposition reciprocal. If I say ejsti;n oJ a[nqrwpo”, it is either man is something else, or it is reciprocal with a previous description and way expressed by ou\to”, suv, etc. There is an exception where the absolute existing One comes in. I can say oJ Qeo;” h\n, h\n oJ lovgo”. But this distinctly shews that existence is formally included in the affirmation of the verb. This only confirms the principle. I could not say e[stin oJ a[nqrwpo”. I could say oJ a[nqrwpo” h\n, because there it is historical, not absolute; that category of being was, kai; oujk e[sti. So I could say on the sixth day ejgevneto oJ a[nqrwpo”, because it is historical: here oJ a[nqrwpo” is the subject, and existence is affirmed of him. So one might say ejgevneto a[nqrwpo”: only here a[nqrwpo” becomes predicate, and hence individual, because “was” is one thing that was, and that one thing was man — a man. And this gives such a clear force to ejn ajrchsee footnote/ h\n oJ lovgo”: ejn ajrch/’ deprives it of created existence, giving h\n absolute existence, and oJ lovgo” is necessarily an individual. No man takes it for a category of beings.
+[Compare Donaldson’s Gr. Gr. 394 (b) (c), page 349, ed. 2. Ed.]
++[It occurs in the speech of Aeschines against Ctesiphon, �85. 33 (Orat. Gr. Reiske, 3: 615). The use of the article strikingly confirms the positions in the text. For in the section before we have to;n Fivlippon, kai; to;n jAlevxandron where the aim was to set in relief the detailed, distinct, and accumulated calumnies laid to the charge of Demosthenes. Afterwards, where the Macedonian king and his son are only alluded to historically, without any such rhetorical object, no article is employed: e[pi Filivppou zwsee footnotento” pri;n jAlevxandron eij” th;n ajrch;n katasthsee footnotenai. Lastly, when he wishes to mark Philip and Alexander as a joint object of abuse on the part of Demosthenes, he employs but one article. It is not correct therefore to treat this case as exceptional, though it is so regarded by Middleton (Doctrine of the Greek Art., Rose’s ed., 1855, pages 61, 63, 86). The article thus employed with the first of two proper names indicates the common position (at least pro hac vice) of those named thus together. It is no question of general license, or of neglect, but of strictly regular use, as also with abstract or concrete terms, clauses, etc. — Ed.]
[p. 98] A noun is a mere name, the designation of “what” or character (not proper names of course). Thus house, man, cat, dog, in any language, names “what” a thing is, not an individual: oJ points out and individualizes. In certain styles (which raise a question), as fables, proverbs, these may in a measure merge, because particular care is there taken to paint a character. Latin is metaphysically special in this and uses all nouns so, as venit homo. Number, unless by special designation, gives individuality, but the genius of the language is to abstract into kind. Greek is more material for individualism as to what is external; that is, oJ is so. French is still more, which makes it the most exact and the most narrow language in the world, incapable of stating abstractions. It individualizes and materializes everything. [Anqrwpo”, ajnhvr, gunhv, is “what.” Man, or a man, is a question of the style of the language. We think it must be a man, that is, we make it precise by a number. Ein Mensch, ein Mann, un homme, un uomo, un hombre, etc.; but in such a sentence it is really what kind of being came, though I may add only one (ein, a, un). In German, unity is secured by emphasis on ein; in French, when it is distinctive, you must add seul, pas un homme being characteristic. You must say pas un seul homme; but un is not less “one” for all that. JO though singular, is not this (though ei\” is so used at any rate in New Testament); it is indicative of personal individuality, and, if an abstraction or a contrasted part, as hJ ajgaphv or to; swsee footnotema, is still this; it points out an individual in contrast with others. If there were only one man, I could not say oJ unless in contrast with what was not man, as oJ Qeov”. Hence oJ lovgo” Qeo;” h\n is no diminution of the force of Qeov”, but only shews that it is not the whole individual Being in contrast with all others; oJ Qeov” is. JO a[nqrwpo”, a particular known man, or oJ a[nqrwpo” mankind, are both in contrast with others, that is, individualized or pointed out. So hJ ajgaphv does this, hJ ajgaphv does that. It is that quality or kind of thing that does it in contrast with others, as pivsti”, ejlpiv”. But when these things are names by themselves, existence being in mevnei, it is pivsti”, ejlpiv”, ajgaphv, but the greatest of these is hJ ajgaphv, here individually contrasted. I know not whether I have brought this out so clearly in my paper, though the principle is there; but so it is.
[p. 99] Shades of style may vary. I may say, the renard, a certain renard, or Maitre Renard; but this a question of poetry or descriptive fable.
Basileuv” is constantly cited as the instance of an appellative passing into a name. It is not so. Thus, if I remember (why, I cannot say), it is used in the beginning of Homer without one — oJ ga;r basilhsee footnotei> colwqeiv” (I cite from memory), meaning Agamemnon. There were many such titles in the East (Tartan for general, and others) which may have led to the use of it in Greek similarly, basileuv” being the word translated. — Pasee footnoten ai\ma is no difficulty. It is every case of blood shed, not all the blood as a whole. So pasee footnotesa savrx. The article gives always the entire of what is said, as it points out one object as one: hence pasee footnotesa hJ savrx would have been quite false. jEn panti; crovnw/ also distributes the time: it was not a continuous whole Peter would speak of, but “at every time.”
Again, oijkodomhv presents no difficulty. It does not mean “a building” but “building.” I doubt that it is ever used for “a building”; if so, by accommodation, as in English. Thus pasee footnotesa oijkodomhv would be every thing added by an act of building. This being adapted it grows to an entire whole. Indeed it is difficult to say pasee footnotesa hJ oijkodomh; au[xei, and perhaps to this answers kai; uJmeisee footnote” sunoikodomeisee footnotesqe. I mean the idea — without deciding on the reading.
The other two seeming anomalies are proper names. Now with a proper name as such I doubt you can have an article save as a reference, and then it is not immediate, I apprehend. I say pasee footnotesa hJ jIoudaiva, because I think of a country and bring it thus into one whole. But if I think of a name, I cannot use the article: a name is not a thing, but something said about a thing. If I say oJ Xenofwsee footnoten, it is the man well known, or that I have been speaking about, Xenophon. I cannot point out a name as a subject of thought, as it is a predicate of a thing. Hence pasee footnotesa JIerosovluma not an exceptional case; it is a name, as always, without an article. And the name is necessarily an individual. And I cannot gather the name of a city into one as a country: the sense is pasee footnotesa hJ povli” — which city is called JIer.
I apprehend that pasee footnote” oi\ko” jIsrahvl is similarly circumstanced. Pasee footnote” oJ oi\ko” would give one the idea of a material house. It is possible the figure might be so carried on; but the dropping of the article shews to me that the figure was dropped, and oi\ko” jIsrahvl is as one word. In English we say, “All the house of”: the force of the material thing is carried into the figure. But with a name, though we say “all,” we have no article; it is “all Israel.” We could not say “all the Israel”; we could say “the Israel of God,” because we think of all the persons composing it, and assemble them by the “the” into one. Pasee footnote” oJ oi\ko” would arrest my mind at “house,” and Israel be only its name — the name of the house. This is avoided, and oi\ko” jIsrahvl is viewed as a unity carried by the name itself. One of the main points of the article is the gathering a composite thing into unity, making one whole of it to the mind, a name being the name of an individual and allowing by its nature no composite idea. It is one person. This can have no place here. Middleton was right therefore in connecting oi\ko” with jIsrahvl. I judge that pasee footnote” oi\ko” jIsrahvl has a peculiar and exceptional reason, from oi\ko” being used in opposition. In pasee footnote” oJ oi\ko” tousee footnote jIsrahvl Israel would not have been itself the house, but it would have been a house belonging to Israel distinct from Israel. Oi\ko” would have been distinctly designated as an object, and so separated from Israel; it is pasee footnote” Israel, but I mean the house, not the person.
We may add that Middleton takes indefiniteness for granted from the absence of the article, though shewing its presence is not always a proof of definiteness. I have no objection to take oJ as by itself (it is substantially the same principle, but from not seeing the mental or metaphysical noun M. broke down in prepositions and the like) and the noun, etc., as itself something stated about oJ. Only the oJ indicates something clear to the speaker, not yet to the hearer, oJ being the person or thing I have in my mind, which is geraiov”, and then the hearer knows. When I say oJ, I say something exists which I am thinking about: what I explain is what follows. Hence ejstivn etc. meets the case without oJ, in words of having. If I have, I must have something, and so on. Accounting for omissions is another thing from accounting for the use. Middleton’s work did not require it, and he has not done it, save as illustrating the use and his theory; my principle does, and claims to account for every case, save only common and proverbial expressions which affect brevity, as “he is gone down town,” they say in America: it is a useful abbreviation, but no question of grammar. “Gone into harbour” may mean a particular one, but it is a state; and so in Greek, eij” limevna, kata; povlin, of Piraeus and Athens, quoted by Middleton. But these are special cases; not rule, but habit from locality, and found in all languages. I do not find Middleton treat such a case as gunh; ei\ce. But I find no omissions which are not explained by the answer to “What?” That is, an attributive or a personal name. With a genitive it is part of the word. In yuchsee footnote” o[rganon to; swsee footnotema, yuchsee footnote” o[rganon is one idea. You might say to; swsee footnotemav ejsti to; o[rganon thsee footnote” yuchsee footnote”, but there it would be reciprocal and exclusive, not merely attributive or a qualification. I take up a[ggelo” faivnetai, a[nqrwpo” ajphvnthse. Supposing for a moment that it was merely the Greeks not having an indefinite article, accounting for the article’s use is not touched, nor the explanation of a multitude of omissions, when it might be by a given principle. But I am not content with this. In good Greek we should have generally tiv”, as in Luke. [Aggelo” Kurivou I believe may be partly taken as Hebrew language in Matthew 1, 2; but we have in Mark a[nqrwpo”; in Luke a[nqrwpov” ti”. I doubt its being strictly good Greek to leave it out, save in proverbs and apologues which affect what is characteristic and abound in such expressions in all languages. Greek has tiv” which has the sense of an indefinite article, and uses it; as we see in Luke 7: 37 (Mark 5: 25, gunhv ti”), Mark 5: 2, 21, Luke 7: 12, etc., Luke 6: 17, Acts 6: 7, John 12: 9, Acts 23: 9, Mark 7: 25, Matthew 9: 20. These passages my memory has furnished from scripture, and such have to be accounted for.
My conviction is that tiv” answers to the indefinite article as to the absence of any word. The difference is this: tiv” notes an individual object like oJ, only generalized like “a,” “an.” The word by itself answers, as I said, to “what?” oJ, tiv”, or osti” gives one whole individual object. When there is nothing, it is a scene before me, the anarthrous word saying “what” it is. Thus several are with ijdouv, what? gunhv, o[clo”. The last generally has oJ as contrasted with individuals, or the particular crowd that followed Jesus. But the article would be given with any known body of people, oJ dhsee footnotemo”. We have o[clo” poluv”, plhsee footnoteqo”. We have also a[nqrwpo” as in Matthew 4: 4, 13: 28, 31. A concordance will furnish many others.
[p. 102] The result of the use of these words to my mind confirms the principle: oJ is a whole, a particular individual, tiv” an individual separated in thought from others. The absence of the article simply in the nominative is always characteristic, not individual. In Luke it is generally tiv”, and better Greek. [Oclo” ti” could hardly be, because it is a confusion of individuals, a crowd, and can scarcely be individualized; oJ suits, for it is a known pointed out crowd. When I say a[nqrwpo” ti”, I separate that man from others; so a[ggelov” ti”, I think of other angels, etc. When I say, a[nqrwpo”, a[ggelo”, gunhv, I think of the kind of being.
Hence in proverbs, parables, fables, which describe, it is more usual to omit the article, unless they read as if a real history. Chat �chaud� is the kind of thing, un chat �chaud� is an individual cat. English has not this unless very rarely in proverbs. If I say a[ggelo”, it is not a[nqrwpo” or other means employed. If I say a[ggelov” ti” it is distinct from other angels. I do not know that I have discussed this form of its application, but it is the same principle. The absence of the article gives kind or attributives, not an objective individual, though it may be such. Grammarians must not make a rule for what is merely the shortening tendency of habits of speech. All aphorisms or substantive statements as such are anarthrous. Perhaps brevity occasioned it; but in fact they are in their very nature essentially characteristic and only so — it is their object. Chat �chaud� craint l’eau froide. Chat �chaud� characterizes the thing which fears even cold water; l’eau froide is not grammatical, it would be de l’eau froide.
So pavntwn crhmavtwn mevtron a[nqrwpo” is all essentially characteristic; were it twsee footnoten crhmavtwn, it would be a certain set of things. So here of a[nqrwpo”: the being that has this character or title is measure of all things. Here a measure would do in English, or the, because it is merely characteristic, no object: in fact, it is the predicate. Man is not here looked at as a person; it means humanity, or what man is.
Take again Isocr. page 8, B, kalo;” qhsauro;” par j ajndri; spoudaivw/ cavri” ojfeilomevnh: Id. page 28, A, lovgo” ajlhqh;” kai; novmimo” kai; divkaio” yuchsee footnote” ajgaqhsee footnote” kai; pisthsee footnote” ei[dwlovn ejsti.+ In all these cases the phrases express moral characteristics, and are not viewed as objects of the mind. It has the force of anything that has this character — a cavri” ojf. — lovgo” ajlhqhv”, any one which is such. This is not an abstraction but a universal; that is, a species which is known by a character, a predicate of each individual which has such a character. There may be all sorts of lovgoi, but not such as this. JO points out an object, an individual if you please, a real subsisting thing to the mind about which I affirm something. An abstract noun (not a universal) is an objective personification of the idea, and hence as such would have the article; but a universal, or species, is the character of all the individuals composing it. Its being in the place of the predicate changes nothing. When I say a[nqrwpo”, it is evidently such; it is the character of all the beings of the species. It is this character which makes it a mevtron; the individual man is — that would not be characteristic. And when I put the article, it ceases to be characteristic and becomes an object; oJ a[nqrwpov” ejsti zwsee footnoteon logikovn. I personify the whole race in order to predicate something about it. This would not do for an aphoristic sentence. See the multitude of sentences in James of this character.
+[Compare Jelf’s Gr. Gr., � 460. — Ed.]
[p. 103] Matthew 14: 25 furnishes also a usage from abbreviation as in English. “I had fourth watch”: regular English would give “the fourth watch” contrasted with the third. But this is needless; it is the short characteristic of a known object. Quakers say, “fourth day,” “third month,” not “the.” It is the same principle but more obscurely. So as to Matthew 22: 38. The Jews measured the commandments to make out righteousness; as poiva ejntolh; megavlh says the young man (which has this well-known character). The Lord answers, not by formally comparing this with other commandments, but by so characterizing it. I do not think He means a first and great, though the grammar would bear it, but an absolute characteristic. This is first and great; but deutevra only by deutevra, the commandment so to be characterized. But this is brief familiarity of language, not grammatical distinction.
jEn ajrchsee footnote/, John 1: 1, is evident; ejn thsee footnote/ ajrchsee footnote/ would at once lead me to the beginning of something; whereas ejn ajrchsee footnote/ is characteristically (that is, universally and absolutely) such. This form of thought is rare in English, but is found “in measure,” “in part,” but only where it has become from use characteristic and abstract. In Greek it is much more common, particularly with ejn, as also with ejk. When a word in English is used characteristically, the form is found, particularly in characteristic words, “in anger,” “in pain”; but we say “in a bad temper,” because it is one kind of temper.
[p. 104] I should rather suppose Acts 7: 36 to be used as a proper name; the rather as we have ejn thsee footnote/ ejrhvmw/ in the same passage. Aijguvptw/ and ejruqrasee footnote/ are as articles, that is, indicate an object, as a name sufficiently does.
In John 4: 37, I apprehend, oJ aJlhqinov” must be taken as an attribute of oJ lovgo”, not as a predicate; “in this is the true word” [verified]; whereas in 1 Peter 5: 12 it is the usual form. In the former ejstivn has the sense of subsists. I find Winer and Middleton both take it so.
If we cannot seize characteristic universals, we shall never get at the use of the article.
As to the article in tousee footnote mhnov” it is no way difficult; it is like the month, has the force of each, and points out a particular month, inasmuch as it is each one. Distinctive parts would have the article as in contrast with another part: as “a half” is only a quantity, “the half” is in contrast with the other half. Contrast always has it. A class would bear no article; it is an idea, not an existence, being a predicate of something else, as pathvr is a character, not an existing one pointed out. So a[nqrwpo”, Qeov”, though the words may become by an article a specifically existing object. Words joined by a conjunction are also persons joined to some idea by the article, or the same person as oJ Qeo;” kai; swthvr. These are qualities of the one who is oJ. It is sometimes irregular in form; as, when there are two ambassadors, oJ is with the first only, but the reason remains the same.
I do not deny that there is a difference when the adjective is first and when the noun is first, though it is hardly apparent sometimes. It is so in French, but the object, c’est un temps rude, is in contrast with doux or agr�able; while un rude temps is but one idea. I apprehend it is the same in Greek. I doubt the exactitude of Hermann’s rule, that in oiJ oijktroi; paisee footnotede” the principal stress is on oijktroi, in oiJ page oiJ oijktroiv it is rather on paisee footnotede”. For in oJ poimh;n oJ kalov” there is emphasis on kalov”. In the phrase oJ k. page there is no emphasis anywhere, only distinction from one not kalov”. So in to; agion pn. it is the Holy Spirit, not another; but to; pn. to; agion brings agion into relief.
[p. 105] As for the expression twsee footnote/ aJmartwlwsee footnote/ (Luke 18: 13), it is evidently distinctive, as if I should say; Who is the sinner of the world? The publican answers, I am. He is the sinner. It is contrast, but so characterized in comparison with all others.