UNKNOWN

UNKNOWN

— - ^{[pp. 421–422]} I do not think the smallest doubt can rest on the sense of Galatians 2: 16.⁺ We have only to read the rest of the verse to make the meaning of the apostle perfectly clear, and more than clear if possible, earnestly contradicting such a sense: ejk πίστεως Cristou’ kai; οὐκ ἐξ ejrgwn novmou. That makes his meaning incontrovertible. But he adds as anxious to insist on the point, διότι ἐξ ἔργων novmou ouj δικαιωθήσεται pa’sa σάρξ. How this can be an explanation that we shall be justified by works of law by the faith of Christ, I am at a loss to understand. But it is a mistake as to the force of eij μή or eij de; μή. Not that it is not used as “unless” or “except.” But its connection with the main idea of the previous phrase, and opposition to the manner there stated, is common: it is really stronger than ἀλλά having the force of only, or but only. Compare Romans 14: 14, where the dij auJtou’ must be left out, and the “unclean,” or main idea taken by itself. Only in that case a thing is unclean, and the point is the opposition to the way or manner. It is exactly so here. There κοινός is the common idea, justifying here — dij auJtou’ the special case hypothetically put and denied. Introduce dij auJtou into the second member of the sentence and you make nonsense of the whole. And so you do here if we read what follows. So Matthew 12: 4. It was not lawful for him to eat nor those with him, but only for the priests. So Luke 4: 26, 27, but (or but only) to Sarepta, which was not in Israel: so as to Naaman. There is always the contradiction of, or opposition to, something in eij μή. The question is to what? In the first case it is of priests to common Jews; in Luke it is to “in Israel;” in Romans “by nature” or to him who so esteems it; in Galatians law and Christ; and there is always a common idea too, as in Matthew, lawfulness to eat; in Luke, widows or lepers; in Romans uncleanness; in Galatians, justifying. Hence the common idea is not uncommonly left out, and only eij de; μή put in, and the contradicting matter only stated. Meyer, Ellicott, De Wette, Hammond, Fritzsche on Romans 14: 14, all take it as “but,” or “but only” in Galatians 2: 16. The difference of ἀλλά seems to me to be that there is not necessarily a common point or subject as well as contrast, but simply contrast (not this, but that); with eij μή there is always a common point about which the contrast takes place. But it is a great mistake to think that it makes the whole antecedent clause the common point, which is what the question would do, so that the clause following it is a condition simply of the whole. You may see the grammatical statements in Klotz’s Devarius, Hoogeveen, or Viger, Bos’ Ellipses, and Winer 654 (sec. 66), the rest under eij μή, and the Commentaries in loco. In both, passages from the classics will be found. The point of the difference of ἀλλά and eij μή, has not been noticed that I am aware of; but I think it will be found just.

There does not seem to me to be the smallest doubt as to the sense of the passage; at any rate, that it means what the question supposes by the grammatical force of the words is a mistake. Passages such as Romans 14: 14 demonstrate it, and others, too, as Mark 13: 32; Revelation 9: 4. In 1 Corinthians 7: 17 it stands elliptically by itself for “only.” Romans 3: 27 fully confirms what I have said of the difference of ἀλλά. When the supposed common point is set as to be, and a condition or way of it is negatived, what follows eij μή is exclusive and contradictory of the condition or way. Thus οὐδέ ti” a[llo” αἴτιος ἀθανάτων eij μή νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς. A cause is supposed, negatived, exclusive and contradictory of a[llo”; when there is no negative and the case supposed, the eij μή negatives the supposition and says why. Μιλτιάδην de; to;n ejn Maraqw’ni eij” to; βάραθρον ejmbalei’n ἐψηφίσαντο, kai; eij mh; diav to;n πρύτανιν eJ evpesen a[n: “if it had not been for the Prytanis, he would have fallen into it.” There are cases where μή is left out, and eij de; put with a possible substitution. It answers in the cases of exclusion to sp,a, in Hebrew. See Wolff’s Curae in loco.

When the whole sentence is negative, the eij μή becomes a positive affirmation of what follows, as 1 Corinthians 10: 13, Mark 8: 14 and others. Schétz’s Hoogeveen gives a pretty full explanation under the words eij μή. In result, the negation of works, or faith in Christ to the contradiction or exclusion of works of law, is clearly the sense of the passage.

⁺It has been lately asserted on the strength of ἐὰν μή in this verse that, since it is by faith of Him who is the end and fulfilling of the law that men are justified, it involves in itself the full virtue of a legal righteousness. The apostle does not say, as he often does elsewhere, that man is not justified by works but by faith simply; but that he is not justified by works of law, “except through faith of Jesus Christ,” etc. Is this just? Is it true that this is the natural force of the words here as contrasted with ejk πίστεως cristou, and that it would be possible to justify the authorised verse only on the assumption of a large ellipsis, “man is not justified by works of law (and therefore not justified at all), except by faith of Jesus Christ”?