APRIL 10TH, 1928
APRIL 10TH, 1928
[p. 166] BELOVED BROTHER, — I thank you for your letters, and the correspondence as to —, which I return herewith. After giving the matter consideration we decided locally that we could not do otherwise than receive the brother and sister commended to us from — .
It is impossible for us at a distance to judge of local conditions and details. Responsibility as to this rests on those who are near to the seat of trouble. In this matter they have all reached a common judgment, which has been accepted by neighbouring meetings (who have also some measure of local knowledge) without question. It would be a very serious matter for us at a distance to challenge this. We should feel it needful to have the clearest evidence that the decision was an unrighteous one before taking a step which would certainly seem to be contrary to the normal order of the house of God.
I fully recognise the value and importance of suspending fellowship in cases where this course is called for. It has been the divine way, I believe, of dealing with some cases. But I think you will agree that it is not a mode of action to be adopted automatically without spiritual exercise in every case of local breaches. I have known at least one instance in which it was sought to be wrongly applied by brethren at a distance from the local trouble. It is available for application in spiritual intelligence in cases which call for it. But if a breach were obviously caused unrighteously, or in support of principles not in accord with the truth of fellowship in a general sense, no shutting up of both parties to the breach would be called for. It must be in each case a question of spiritual exercise and priestly discernment. Responsibility of judging as to this would specially attach to those in the immediate neighbourhood, and I think the Lord could be counted upon to give wisdom to those responsible as waiting upon Him in uprightness and dependence.
In the case the brethren in the district around have judged that it was not a case for shutting up. We, at a distance and knowing very little of the local conditions, are not prepared to say that it was. Our brethren have judged that the seceders went out without justification for so doing, and that they can only be regarded as having acted in a way contrary to the truth of the fellowship.
There was evidently sufficient enquiry, or evidence of some kind, to carry the consciences and judgment of saints in the [p. 167] three nearest meetings. Is it not right for us, who are at a distance, to assume that our brethren in the immediate district have exercised their responsibility in a sober and godly way, and in the fear of the Lord? Our brethren at — and —, who are, I suppose, their next nearest neighbours, have seen no reason to question that they have done so.
I should not be prepared to rule out, as prejudice, a moral judgment which may have been formed during years of exercise by those who in neighbouring meetings have been anxiously watching the course of events in a meeting where conditions were unhappy. Is there not, at least, a possibility of there being a sober and godly character about such vigilance, as even a spiritual and priestly power of discernment as to what was working? If so, how could it be set aside as having no weight, or as a matter which should not enter into account, in view of a godly judgment? If there were priestly qualities present in neighbouring meetings should we not expect a far more just estimate of local conditions than could be formed by those at a distance?
I do not think it would be right to set aside as prejudice the judgment of “godly and upright men deserving of esteem”, who have been in personal touch with the state of things locally. If any have had, in the ordering of the Lord, special opportunities of forming a spiritual estimate of what was going on, it can hardly be laid down as a principle that the judgment of such persons must be regarded as prejudice. They have not pre-judged in any unrighteous sense. Weighing of things in godly exercise does not, surely, disqualify persons from exercising a responsibility which may subsequently attach to them of expressing a formal judgment. If there is a priestly element in it it is precisely what qualifies them to lead the saints to a righteous judgment.
The Lord’s mind may be missed in a local judgment, or in the judgment of a district as to a local breach. But I am convinced that normal order in the house of God is maintained by respecting a local judgment, or — in the case of a local breach — a judgment of adjacent meetings, rather than by saints at a distance challenging it without most unquestionable proofs of its being an unrighteous judgment. If a mistake is made it would appear to be a godly course to wait on the Lord to adjust it locally, though this would not exclude the expression of exercise by others if need be. The normal order would be [p. 168] for those at a distance to accept what was done. If not accepted the responsibility would rest on those who took this course of making manifest that the judgment was clearly an unrighteous one.
The Glanton case was altogether different from the one now in question. In that case there was an interference with the Lord’s rights, and with the direct responsibility to Him of saints in another town. It raised a question of principle which was universal in its bearing. Glanton acted in a matter in which it was not their responsibility to act. The meetings in — have acted in a matter which did clearly come within their responsibility, and they have arrived at a common judgment. Saints elsewhere will have to be careful about challenging such a judgment. To do so would be to take a course which is not according to the normal order of the house of God. We in have not felt at liberty to do so.
With love in the Lord Jesus,
Yours affectionately in Him,
April 10th, 1928.